In this article we analyze firms investment incentives in liberalized electricity markets. Since electricity is economically non storable, it is optimal for firms to invest in a differentiated portfolio of technologies in order to serve strongly fluctuating demand.
Introduction
In this article we analyze firms investment incentives in liberalized electricity markets.
In those markets firms choose to invest in different types of power plants which allow production of electricity at different levels of marginal cost. Since electricity is not storable at reasonable cost, it is optimal for firms to invest in a differentiated portfolio of technologies in order to serve strongly fluctuating demand.
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Prior to the liberalization of electricity markets, regulated monopolists decided on optimal investment and pricing strategies. In the course of liberalizing those markets in Europe and the US, which started in the 1990's, regulated monopolistic generators have been transformed into competing, but potentially strategically acting firms. The present chapter aims to respond to the changed reality in restructured electricity markets and model investment decisions of strategic firms in those markets.
For a single regulated firm, optimal investment and pricing decisions have been thoroughly analyzed in the so called peak load pricing literature. All main findings are summarized in Crew and Kleindorfer (1986) , the first contributions date back to the seminal work of Boiteux (1949) and Steiner (1956) . That literature and all its extensions analyze optimal investment and pricing decisions of a single firm whose product is non-storable and demand fluctuates over time. The classical framework allows to determine welfare maximizing investment in a single technology. This was subsequently extended to the case of optimal investment in several technologies under the objective of either welfare, or profit maximization.
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The peak load pricing literature was thus perfectly suited (and widely used) to model investment decisions in electricity markets prior to liberalization, where electricity indeed was supplied by regulated monopolies.
Liberalization of electricity markets, which started in the 1990's throughout Europe, has changed this picture dramatically. In many countries electricity generation has been opened to competition and regulated monopolistic generators have been transformed into competing firms. Most interestingly, the results obtained in the peak load pricing literature 1 Typical industry investment in electricity markets contains for example nuclear, lignite, coal, gas and oil plants. Nuclear and lignite plants are expensive to build but produce at low cost and thus run most of the time. Coal and especially gas and oil plants are less expensive to build, but produce more expensively. They will produce only part of the time in order to serve higher demand and peaks. Compare figure 1 for an illustration of typical industry marginal cost in Germany, 2006. 2 In a so called second best approach this was further extended and allows to determine optimal investment choice, maximizing any weighted sum of profit and welfare. for a single firm under the objective of welfare maximization can easily be extended to the case of perfectly competitive firms in liberalized markets. In a recent contribution Joskow and Tirole (2007) thoroughly discuss all those results in the light of perfectly competitive restructured electricity markets. All the results obtained in the peak load pricing literature, however, are not applicable in case firms do not behave perfectly competitive, but interact strategically when making their investment decisions.
Especially in Europe policy makers are seriously concerned by the exercise of market power in the electricity sector, which has been extensively analyzed and documented for the wholesale markets. electricity markets are to be made.
In the present article we thus extend the framework of investment in several technologies analyzed in the peak load pricing literature for a single firm to the case of strategically interacting firms.
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In a two stage market game firms first make their investment decisions prior to the spot market which is subject to uncertain or fluctuating demand, then firms compete at the spot market. Firms can decide to invest in many different available technologies, which all differ in their cost of investment and corresponding cost of production.
Firms investment decisions thus determines the precise composition of industry investment in all technologies. That is, we obtain the precise shape of industry marginal cost function.
5
Our main results can be summarized as follows: Most importantly we derive equilibrium investment of strategic firms, establishing existence and uniqueness. We then compare equilibrium investment choice to the benchmark cases of perfect competition (welfare maximization), monopoly (profit maximization) and the so called second best solution 6 derived in the peak load pricing literature. Interestingly, under imperfect competition firms have a strong incentive to invest into low marginal cost technologies in order to negatively influence their competitors' spot market outputs. We are able to establish properties under which this strategic effect is so intense that equilibrium investment in low-marginal-cost technologies in oligopoly is even above the welfare optimal level.
Based on the theoretical framework developed we then empirically analyze equilibrium investment for the German electricity market. As a main result we find that investment of strategic firms 7 in base-load technologies (producing at marginal cost below 25 €/MWh, such as nuclear and lignite plants) exceeds first best investment levels. Strategic underinvestment takes place exclusively in middle-and peak-load technologies (such as gas, or oil-fired plants). We are furthermore able to determine the impact of strategic behavior on the entire distribution of wholesale prices in the long run.
potential for the exercise of market power in the German Electricity market, in the long run, when firms investment decisions are taken into account.
The article is structured as follows: In section 2 the framework is introduced. In sections 3 and 4 we derive the benchmark cases of perfect competition and monopoly. In section 5 we analyze the case of imperfect competition, and compare them to the benchmark scenarios (section 6) . In section 7 empirically analyze investment decisions in the German electricity market for all different market structures. Section 8 concludes.
The Model
We analyze a two stage market game where firms choose cost functions under demand uncertainty and make output choices after market conditions unraveled.
Industry demand is subject to random variations. Denote by θ ≥ 0 the range of possible demand scenarios and by F (θ) the probability distribution over those demand scenarios, with the corresponding density f (θ) = F θ (θ).
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Market demand in scenario θ is given by
, without loss of generality we assume B(0) = 0. Whenever P (Q, θ) > 0 the following assumptions are satisfied:
Prior to unraveling of uncertainty, firms decide on the technologies they want to install.
Each unit of a technology c allows for production of one unit at marginal cost c ∈ R + and comes at marginal cost of investment denoted by k(c). 
The situation we want to analyze is captured by the following two stage situation.
At stage one firms determine their technology mix by choosing their investment function
. , x n (c) the vector of all investment choices and by
x j (c) the industry investment. As illustrated in figure 2, the investment choice x i (c) of firm i determines which output can be produced at Marginal cost c.
13
At the second stage firms choose their output at the spot market after having observed both the investment choices of all firms and the realization of demand. We denote by q(θ) = (q 1 (x, θ), . . . , q n (x, θ)) the vector of outputs of the n firms in scenario θ, and let
be total quantity produced in the market. In the following we now determine profits of firm i for fixed cumulative investment x(c),
In order to determine total profits of firm i associated to some investment choice x i (c), we first determine profits associated to some partial investment dx i (c 0 ) as illustrated in figure 2. That is we determine profits generated by technology c 0 , the amount invested in this technology is given by dx i (c 0 ). Observe that such investment will only yield positive revenues for demand realizations θ > θ c 0 i . Expected revenues generated by dx(c 0 ) are given by the expected markup in all those demand realizations where indeed production is at or above marginal cost c 0 times the amount dx(c 0 ) invested:
On the other hand, the cost of investment in technologies dx i (c 0 ) is given by the (constant) marginal cost k(c 0 ) of investment times the amount times the amount dx(c 0 ) invested:
In the context of electricity generation, the above analysis corresponds to determining expected profits generated by a small power plant of size dx i (c 0 ) which produces at marginal cost c 0 and comes at a cost of investment given by k(c 0 ).
In order to obtain total profits associated to the entire investment-choice x i (c), we need to sum up for all technologies, where investment took place. Suppose firm i did choose to invest into technologies c ∈ [c i , c i ], with 0 ≤ c i < c i , then integration over all those technologies yields:
This expression can be transformed by applying the rule of integration by parts:
The first summand of (2) yields profits of interior investment x i < x i (c i ) and the second summand yields profits of investment at the capacity bound
We now analyze the impact of a variation of the investment function x i (c) on firm i's total profits. We have to take into account two different types of such variations as illustrated in figure 3. First we consider interior cases, where investment is changed by some amount dx (c ,c ) for all technologies c ∈ [c , c ], with c < c ≤ c i . Such variation is denoted by
dx (c ,c ) and is given by expression (3) of lemma 1. Second we consider variations of the overall capacity x i by the amount dx
, changing investment for all technologies above the highest technology c ≥ c i . Such variation is denoted by
dx (c i ) and is given by expression (4) of lemma 1. When computing those first derivatives it is important to notice that the spot market equilibrium Q(x, θ) depends on firms investment choices. Thus both the critical demand realizations and the realized market prices will change as investment x i (c) of firm i is modified. 
(ii) 
Proof see Appendix 8.
Lemma 1 gives the impact of a variation of firm i's investment on it's profits both for the interior and for the boundary case
14
. The analysis up to now does not yet specify the type of (strategic) behavior of firms both at the spot markets and the investment stage. In order to solve for the cases of Perfect competition, Monopoly and of strategic interaction in the subsequent section, these first derivatives of lemma 1 provide a valuable starting point.
Perfect Competition -Welfare Maximization
As a Benchmark we determine the case of perfectly competitive behavior both at the spot markets and the investment stage.
15
In our framework, for the case of perfect competition, only industry investment X(c) = n j=1 x j (c) and industry output Q(θ) = n j=1 q j (θ) matter. In order to compare later on to the case of strategic behavior, however, we will explicitly consider n firms which equally share investment and output among each other.
14 A change in total investment by dx which affects all c ≥ c can be determined by setting c = c i and just summing then over (3) and (4). 15 This has already been analyzed in the peak load pricing literature, the first best solution of our framework, however, will serve as a valuable benchmark in order to compare to the case of strategic interaction of firms as analyzed in section 5. Furthermore in the framework chosen, we obtain a smooth solution, which makes its characterization as given in theorem 1 rather short, in contrast to previous contributions on that topic.
The perfectly competitive spot market outcome for fixed industry investment X(c) and fixed realization of uncertainty θ ≥ 0 is given by the well known condition of "price = marginal cost", i.e. P (X(c), θ) = c ∀θ. As in the previous section for the general case, we now define the critical demand realization θ c F B which makes firms produce at marginal cost c. We obtain for θ 
Having specified the outcomes at the spot market under perfect competition for given investment choice, we can now turn towards solving for equilibrium investment choice at stage one. We already have derived general first order conditions in lemma 1. It now remains to adapt those conditions for the case of perfect competition and to verify their sufficiency, as summarized in lemma 2.
Expressions (6) and (7) of lemma 2 can be directly derived from expressions (3) and (4), since the last summand of it's integrands equals zero. This is due to the following two observations: first under perfect competition firms take the market price as given i.e. 
For a change of total capacity x, which affects all c ≥ c i we obtain:
(ii) Second order conditions:
The cross derivatives with respect to different technologies equal zero, i.e.
The second derivatives with respect to the same technologies are always negative, i.e.
2 < 0 and > 0, the reverse for dx
The impact of such variation will reduce expected production cost on the one hand, it will increase however the investment cost of firm i. More specifically this implies that firms when choosing their optimal technology-mix face the following tradeoff: The extra revenues from such substitution in the case of perfect competition are given by the savings in production cost (c − c ), which occur with probability (1 − F (θ 
Proof See appendix 8
In theorem 1 we put all these results together characterizing Industry investment X * 
The critical demand realization θ 
Having specified the outcomes at the spot markets under profit maximization for given 17 Just to give an example: In their more than 50 page survey on the theory on peak load pricing in Crew and Kleindorfer (1986) exact characterizations of quantities invested and exact production of each technology is omitted: "While the lemma indicates which plants are used it does not indicate the amounts of capacity q l and amounts produced by each plant in each period q li . To derive this is complicated and calls for a lengthy theorem which we do not state here (see Crew and Kleindorfer 1979a, pp-42-50, 63-65) .", see Crew and Kleindorfer (1986) , p 45.
investment choice, we can now turn towards solving for optimal investment choice at stage one. Again relying on the general first order conditions derived in lemma 1, we can directly deduce the first order conditions under profit maximization as summarized in lemma 4.
Expression (12) is directly obtained from (3) since it's last integrand equals zero for the case of profit maximization. This is due to the following two observations: first 
Computation of the second order conditions is relegated to appendix 8. 
For an illustration compare figure 4. Crew and Kleindorfer (1986), pp. 77-79) Crew and Kleindorfer (1986) 
Remark 1 In the peak load pricing literature (see for example

expression (4.58) on p. 79).
As it turns out, within our approach of a continuous technology set all those solutions share the same critical demand realizations
Firms investment x λ (c) = 1 n X λ (c) differs, however, depending on the tightness of the profit constraint, as expressed through the parameter λ. We obtain The concept of second best solutions allows thus to cover both the case of perfect competition and the case of profit maximization. It is important to emphasize however that even for intermediate values 0 < λ < 1, the concept of second best solutions is not capable of capturing strategic interaction of firms which is the topic of the subsequent section.
Strategic Firms -Imperfect Competition
Having reviewed the benchmark cases of welfare and profit maximization in sections 3 and 4, we now turn towards the case of imperfect competition. We derive the equilibrium of the two stage market game where firms first decide on their investment x i (c) and then after having observed investment decisions and realization of demand decide on production
Analogously to the previous analysis we first solve for the spot market equilibria for given Investment decisions x 0 i (c) for each demand realization θ. Since marginal cost are nondecreasing (the capacity choice problem exhibits this property by construction) and due to concavity of profits ensured by assumption 1 (ii), there always exists a unique Cournot equilibrium at the spot market. Since firms investment choices can be asymmetric, in that Cournot equilibrium for given demand realization θ 0 and given investment x 0 (c) firms will produce at different marginal cost. The Cournot equilibrium at the spot market
Those are characterized by of the following well-known equilibrium conditions of the Cournot game:
We can now proceed analogously to the previous sections and characterize the critical 
It is worth-wile to notice that the critical demand realization θ c EQ,i of the Cournot spot market equilibrium has the following property:
Where the right expression just makes use of the initial separability assumption of demand which was assumed to be given by
Having solved for the outcomes at the spot market for fixed investment choice, we can now proceed and solve for the overall equilibrium with respect to firms investment choices.
Again we make use of the general first order conditions derived in lemma 1, and derive the optimal capacity of firm i for fixed investment X −i (c) of all other firms. The first order conditions of firm i for the case of strategic capacity choice are summarized in lemma 5.
Expression (18) is directly obtained from (3) This is due to the following two observa- 
Likewise we obtain expression (19) from (4). We obtain the following optimality conditions for the case of strategic interaction among firms:
Lemma 5 (Optimality Conditions, Strategic Firms) .
(i) First order conditions:
For an interior change affecting c ∈ [c , c ] where (c < c ≤ c i ) we obtain:
and dθ
18 Remember: the critical demand realization is that demand realization θ c EQ,i that will give rise to production cost c for firm i in the Spot market Cournot equilibrium. In the present context this is just the inverse of c
The second derivatives with respect to the same technologies can be shown to be neg- 
Proof see appendix 8.
Also for the case of strategic interaction we observe first of all that again the second order conditions have a very special and simple form: all cross derivatives equal to zero.
Again (for given investment decisions X −i (c)) the profitability of substituting investment in technology c by investment in technology c is solely determined by the investment level Verification of second order condition thus reduces to checking for negative second derivatives with respect to the same technologies, i.e.
The computations involved are relatively burdensome, and we restrict to the case of linear demand in order to maintain tractability of the problem (It seems however that there are no major obstacles when extending the present analysis of second order conditions to the nonlinear case). Furthermore in order to ensure concavity of the problem two further assumptions are required: first the density of uncertainty should not increase too steeply (condition (b)) and second the investment functions chosen by all rivals should become flatter and flatter as the capacity bound x j is approached (condition (c)).
The first order conditions can be interpreted similar to the case of welfare or profit maximization as analyzed in sections 3 and 4. For the interior solution, firms face the trade off of substituting investment in technology c by investment in technology c . Again this decision is driven by the mass above the critical demand realization versus the difference
Under Strategic interaction, however, firms also take into account the impact of their investment decision on the rivals spot market outputs Q −i , since more aggressive cost functions will give a more advantageous position for the spot market competition.In principle the same argument holds true for the boundary case (again we observe the term
dx (c i ) )), however since there exist only symmetric equilibria of the overall game as we will show later on, the reaction of firms output choice will be irrelevant since firms anyhow are capacity constrained for those demand realizations.
Most importantly it remains to notice that the first order conditions of firm i do only involve levels of investment choice x i (c), but not on it's slope x i (c). When checking for potential deviations from a given equilibrium candidate with fixed investment X −i (c), firm i faces a standard maximization problem can be solved by the point-wise first order conditions (point-wise, since all cross derivatives are zero). Derivation of entire equilibrium candidates (e.g. symmetric candidate) on the other hand will involve the solution of a differential equation. We thus restrict attention to differentiable 
Proof Proof see appendix 8.
19 This ensures that
) is well defined. Similar restriction to differentiable functions are found in many contributions of the literature, compare for example the article on supply function competition by Klemperer and Meyer (1989) .
20 As stated in lemma 5, the second order conditions are always satisfied if conditions (a), (b) and (c) are satisfied. Especially the assumption of linear demand was made mainly in order to limit the computational burden when determining second order conditions. The symmetric candidate solution for the nonlinear case however would only change slightly and is given by the following differential equation: However as explained above, strategic firms take into account their opponents reactions at the spot markets when making their investment decisions. In the following section 6 we provide a detailed discussion, comparing the solutions under imperfect competition to the benchmark cases of welfare and profit maximization.
Comparison of the Theoretical Results
In this section we discuss and compare the solutions obtained in sections 3, 4, and 5. That below the perfectly competitive outcome All second best solutions lie between these two solutions (proportionally according to λ). This is illustrated in figure 4 .
The solution under imperfect competition turns out to be qualitatively different. The reason is that strategic firms take into account that their rivals will reduce their spot market production at the second stage in case they invest more heavily in low marginal cost technologies at the first stage. As a result, the locus of the critical demand realizations both, the usual spot market arithmetics and the locus of the critical demand realization imply that the marginal cost function under imperfect competition will be chosen such that strictly more output is produced at each given marginal cost c than in the case of monopoly.
. This is illustrated in figure 4 . Finally notice that we could replicate firms' total capacity choice x * under imperfect competition by a "second best" scenario (as analyzed in the peak load pricing literature) by the appropriate choice of λ. For the case of n firms, λ = 1 n would yield the same total capacity choice as the n-firm equilibrium. However, for technologies below the capacity bound. In equilibrium firms invest strictly more into low marginal cost technologies than predicted by the λ = 1 n approximation. Thus, even though the approximation would yield the same total capacity, under imperfect competition firms invest relatively more in low marginal cost technologies than predicted. This is nicely illustrated in figure 7 when comparing equilibrium investment for the case of n = 2 and n = 4 firms (i.e. X * EQ (n = 2) and X * EQ (n = 4)) with the corresponding λ-Solutions (i.e. X * λ= 
. We can thus conclude that total capacity invested under imperfect competition is strictly below total capacity in the First Best solution. For interior technologies below the capacity bound, however, this may turn around, since the locus of the critical demand realization is above the benchmark case at each technology c. In the following lemma we provide a condition under which firms invest more in low marginal cost technologies under imperfect competition than in the First Best solution.
Lemma 6 (Over-investment in low marginal cost technologies) In the case of imperfect competition firms invest more in efficient technologies (close to c * ) than in the first best case if and only if
As we can see, for n = 2 firms we will never observe overinvestment in low marginal cost technologies under imperfect competition. For n ≥ 3 firms, however, if the set of technologies available on the market is sufficiently convex, overinvestment in low marginal cost technologies occurs.
24
24 In the subsequent section 7 we apply our theoretical framework to the case of investment choice in
We conclude this section by a discussion of the assumptions necessary in order to obtain existence of the symmetric equilibrium for the case of imperfect competition. While the assumption of linear demand does not seem to be essential in order to obtain our results, other assumptions made on the nature of uncertainty (the distribution of θ) and the set of available technologies k(c) are crucial. In particular we had to restrict the analysis to those densities which do not exhibit upwards jumps, i.e. f (θ) < 0 whenever f (θ) > 0. The reason is that if the distribution had high peaks, firms could want to deviate by "jumping on that peak" creating a situation where they are cheap and the others are relatively expensive just for those values of θ that have a high mass. We furthermore had to choose the framework such that equilibrium investment is a concave function (i.e. x * EQ (c) < 0 for all c ∈ (c * , c * )). The reason is that the reaction of the opponents to more aggressive cost functions is driven by the steepness of their marginal cost functions. The steeper the marginal cost function of the opponents, the smaller their reaction. Notice that the requirement of concave equilibrium investment is closely related to continuity of the technology set k(c). That is, if only a discrete set of technologies is available, the resulting investment choice will be a step function which necessarily violates the above assumption. This implies however that an analysis of equilibrium cost functions under imperfect competition in the framework presented necessarily has to involve a continuous distribution of uncertainty and continuous technology sets. This seems to parallel the findings on supply function equilibria. In a seminal article Klemperer and Meyer (1989) show existence and uniqueness of differentiable supply functions for a continuous distribution of demand uncertainty. In a subsequent contribution Fehr and Harbord (1994) show, however, that those results do not hold for a discrete setting.
Empirical Analysis for the German Electricity Market
In this section we demonstrate how our theoretical insights can be used to assess firms investment decisions in electricity generation facilities in liberalized electricity markets.
Here, for the reason of data availability, we use data of the German electricity market.
Our aim is to fit the theoretical model as closely as possible to the data of the German electricity generation. As illustrated in figure 7, for the case of duopoly (X 2 EQ ) we do not observe overinvestment, whereas for the case of 4 strategic firms (X 2 EQ ) the model predicts over-investment in efficient technologies.
Electricity market for the year 2006 and to compute resulting industry investment choice for the different hypothesis of perfect competition, monopoly and strategic behavior of firms.
In order to use our theoretical model for the analysis we chose to make the following specifications. We assume linear, fluctuating demand P (Q) = θ − bQ. and derive the set of available technologies, given by the pairs of annuities of investment cost on the one hand and production cost on the other. For a given demand distribution, and for given investment and production cost structure k(c), firms investment choices can be calculated as given in theorems 1 2 and 3. The resulting investment choices allow us to derive the price distribution for all 8760 hours of the year and to compare to the observed price distribution.
The major purpose of such empirical analysis is to provide a practical illustration how the theoretical results can be used in order to derive firms investment decisions and resulting wholesale electricity prices for different market structures. The Model parameters are determined as follows: EWI and Prognos (2005) . 31 The results will thus only yield a benchmark for current profitability of investment. Provided, however, that yearly demand is increasing over time (and that strategic timing of investment is not an issue) our procedure should yield accurate predictions, even though once installed capacities cannot be removed the subsequent year.
32 Compare VGB Powertech (2006 case of strategic interaction is sensitive to the numbers of firms, the graph illustrates the case of 2 and 4 firms. The graph illustrates that the presence of market power also has a strong effect on firms investment choices. Most interestingly we observe a strong incentive for overinvestment in efficient technologies, in the case of strategic interaction of 4 firms.
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Up to a level of production cost of 25€/MWh firms invest more than in the first best scenario.
34
As a main result we thus conclude that predicted investment for the German market with four strategic firms in base-load technologies (producing at marginal cost below 25 €/MWh, such as nuclear and lignite plants) exceeds first best investment levels.
Strategic under-investment takes place exclusively in middle and peak load technologies (such as gas, or oil-fired plants). Finally from the predicted capacity levels we now compute the price distribution over all 8760 hours of the year as illustrated in figure 8 . provides the observed price distribution (P Real ), as well as the predicted price distributions for the benchmark cases of perfect competition (P F B ) and Monopoly (P M ) and also for the 33 The German market consists essentially of four large players. Two of them (RWE and E.on) have a market share of 26 % each, while the two smaller ones (ENBW and Vattenfall) together cover 30 % of the market each. Compare, e.g., Monopolkommission (2007) .
34 Remarkably, this is not the case for a hypothetic duopoly of firms, nicely illustrating our theoretical result of lemma 6.
case of strategic interaction (P EQ,4 , 4 firm oligopoly and P EQ,2 duopoly). In order to make the differences more visible, in the figure we focus on prices in the interval [0, 350] . We find that for the parameter configuration we chose, observed prices are somewhere in between the first best scenario and strategic interaction of firms.
Notice that the relatively low level of observed prices (as compared to the strategic scenario) may well be due to the fact that currently firms have more capacity installed than they would have chosen in a liberalized regime.
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Our theoretical analysis implies that the current prices do not yield sufficient investment incentives to sustain the current investment level. Strategic investment would affect the price distribution, as comparison of the curves for the cases F B and EQ illustrates. We can conclude that there seems to be considerable potential for the exercise of market power in the long run when taking firms investment decisions into account.
Conclusion
In this article we analyze firms investment incentives in liberalized electricity markets. Since electricity is economically non storable, it is optimal for firms to invest in a differentiated portfolio of technologies in order to serve strongly fluctuating demand. In the absence of strategic interaction, for a single firm, optimal investment and pricing decisions have been thoroughly analyzed in the so called peak load pricing literature. Those findings were widely used to model investment decisions in electricity markets prior to liberalization, when electricity was supplied by regulated monopolies.
Liberalization of electricity markets which started in the 1990's throughout Europe has changed this picture dramatically. In many countries electricity generation has been opened to competition and regulated monopolistic generators have been replaced by competing firms. All the results obtained in the peak load pricing literature, however, are not applicable in case firms do not behave perfectly competitively, but interact strategically when making their investment decisions. Since electricity markets especially in Europe are thought to be subject to the exercise of market power, however, the formerly used framework of the peak load pricing literature now has only limited use when predicting firms investment decisions in those markets.
It has been the aim of the present article to derive equilibrium investment choice in 35 In the pre-liberalization period, generators where subject to a rate of return regulation that imposed excessive investment incentives.
liberalized electricity markets when firms behave strategically. We have derived equilibrium investment and compared it to the benchmark cases of perfect competition (welfare maximization), monopoly (profit maximization) and the so called second best solution derived in the peak load pricing literature. Interestingly, under imperfect competition firms have a strong incentive to invest into low marginal cost technologies in order to influence their competitors' spot market outputs. We have been able to establish properties under which this strategic effect is so intense that equilibrium investment in low marginal cost technologies in oligopoly is even above the welfare optimal level.
We finally have calibrated the theoretical framework to the problem of investment choice in the German electricity market. As a main result we find that investment of strategic 
The second derivatives with respect to the same technologies are given as follows:
This expression is negative since (5)). And for the second derivative with respect to capacity choice we obtain:
Notice: Since the integrand is continuous at θ c F B (equals zero), the derivative with respect to this lower limit drops out according to Leibnitz rule.
Proof of lemma 3
According to lemma 2, the overall capacity bound X * F B under perfect competition at technology c * needs to satisfy the following to conditions:
We rewrite the integrand of (ii) in terms of the critical demand realization θ c * F B by making use of its definition (5) and obtain:
We obtain expression (8) as given in lemma 3:
Where θ * denotes the critical demand realization where firms start to become capacity constrained and c * is the corresponding technology where firms start to be capacity con- proofs that at least one solution to the above system of two equations must exist.
• Uniqueness: Deriving the slope of θ cap (c) we obtain by implicit function theorem: 
Proof lemma 4
The argument with respect to the cross derivatives is analogous to the proof of lemma 2 in appendix 8. The second derivatives with respect to the same technologies are obtained as follows:
This expression is negative since (10)). For the second derivative with respect to capacity choice we obtain:
Due to assumption 1(ii) the integrand is negative. Notice: Since the integrand of the first order condition is continuous at θ c F B (equals zero), the derivative with respect to this lower limit drops out according to Leibnitz rule.
Proof of Lemma 5 Preliminaries:
Properties of the Spot-market Equilibrium
In order to proof lemma 5, we need to precisely characterize the Cournot-spot market equilibrium and it's reaction to changed investment of firms. In section 5 we characterized the spot market equilibrium somehow unusually without explicitly making use of marginal cost functions C j q (q) but only in terms of the investments x j (c) made by each firm. Only throughout appendix 8 we will make use of the usual notation in terms of marginal cost .
(i) Properties of the spot market equilibrium For fixed θ:
Derive the reaction of the spot market equilibrium for fixed values θ to a change in investment level of firm i at some specific marginal cost c (denoted by dx (c) ). The spot market equilibrium for given marginal cost functions C j q (q j ), for j = 1, . . . , n is characterized by the usual equilibrium conditions for an asymmetric Cournot-equilibrium: (25) with respect to dx (c) yields: (c) , the reaction of spot market output of firm i to it's change in the cost function, and dq j dx (c) the reaction of spot market output of the other firms j:
37 From here on we drop the superscript EQ , in order to save notation. In what follows we always refer to equilibrium outputs of stage 2.
Now we introduce the following notation for all j = 1, ..., n,
Note that R j corresponds to the share that firm j has on the total change in Q. We can now solve the equation system by summing up over all reactions n j=1 dq j dx (c) , and obtain:
We finally obtain for
(ii) Properties of the spot-market equilibrium at θ 
Differentiation wrt x c i yields:
Now we need to recover
dx (c) from equations j = i. We obtain by summing up and making use of R j as defined above:
Summing up over all dx (c) yields the following system of two equations:
Plugging the first equation into the second yields:
And solving for
dx (c) we finally obtain:
we obtain:
Finally we derive an important property of R j (θ c EQ,i ) which will be needed later in order to proof the second order conditions. We obtain for all j = i:
We can thus conclude, that whenever (C 
Now plug in into the equation of firm i. It is important to notice that
. In total we obtain:
It can be verified by simple algebraic manipulation that the above can also be rewritten: 
Solve for q 
Plugging into the first order condition of firm i and solving for q EQ i yields:
Proof of Lemma 5
Part (i): First order conditions
Throughout section 5 we already have shown how expressions (18) and (19) are derived from the general first order conditions stated in lemma 1.
In appendix 8 we have derived expression (27), which is given by:
and expression (32) is given by:
After multiplication we obtain:
This is due to the following two observations: R j is defined in (26) by R j := .
We thus obtain slightly rewriting (18) for the interior first order condition:
Part (ii): Second order conditions
In order to verify second order conditions we first analyze the cross partial derivatives with respect to different technologies and observe that they equal to zero: 
We now focus on the second derivatives with respect to the same technologies, first we focus on the interior case, i.e we need to show
In order to proof concavity of the interior solution, we differentiate expression (34) with respect to dx (c c ) : We now show that also for the boundary case second derivatives are negative, i.e.
2 < 0. In order to do so we need to differentiate expression (19) with respect to dx
, which yields:
Notice that according to Leibnitz rule we need to consider only the derivative of the integrand, the derivative wrt to the lower border cancels out, since the integrand evaluated at θ c EQ,i equals zero. The derivative of the integrand obtains as follows:
When analyzing the sign of
2 , again assumption (c) as stated in the lemma is crucial: the steeper the marginal cost functions of the other firms j, the less pronounced are their
dx (c i ) to changed cost function of firm i. In the limit, whenever firm j is capacity constrained (marginal cost vertical) it will not react at all to changed cost functions of firm i. We thus obtain
2 > 0. Furthermore due to assumption 1, also the first summand is negative (both for the case of linear and nonlinear demand). Concavity of profits for the boundary case can consequently be guaranteed, provided conditions (a), and (c) as specified in lemma 5 are satisfied.
Proof of Theorem 3
The proof of the theorem is in three parts. First we derive the symmetric equilibrium candidate, second we show that deviation from that candidate is not profitable and third we prove that an asymmetric equilibrium cannot exist.
Part I) Derive the Symmetric equilibrium candidate:
A symmetric equilibrium candidate needs to satisfy the first order conditions given in lemma 5. Since firms can choose to invest at any level of marginal cost c ≥ 0, we directly consider the integrand of expression (18), which yields for the case of symmetry:
For x(c) close to zero, the second summand drops out and we simply obtain Whenever c > c * , the interior solution has to satisfy the following differential equation which is obtained directly from (36): the locus x * 0 (c), firms will never find it optimal to remain capacity constrained but will always choose to slightly increase their investment (notice all optimal trajectories exhibit x (c) > 0) and for all pairs (x, c) above the locus x * 0 (c) firms will not find it optimal to increase investment, but will stop to invest choosing to be capacity constrained (which de facto implies x (c) = 0). We can conclude that in the candidate equilibrium the pair (x, c) where firms start to be capacity constrained necessarily must lie on the x * 0 (c) locus. Finally the candidate solution must not only satisfy the interior optimality condition given by expression (18) of lemma 5, but also the optimality condition for optimal overall capacity choice given by expression (19) of lemma 5. For the symmetric case, expression (19) yields all pairs (x, c) which satisfy the optimal total capacity choice condition. We denote their locus by x * CAP (c) which is given as follows:
The locus of the optimal capacity choice condition is illustrated in figure 9 . The candidate equilibrium has to satisfy differential equation (37) and pass through the intersection of the locus x * 0 (c) with the locus x * CAP (c) (point "B" in figure 9 ) as boundary condition. In order to show uniqueness of the symmetric candidate equilibrium it remains to show that the boundary condition is indeed unique, i.e. that the intersection of the locus x * 0 (c) with the locus x * CAP (c) is unique. In order to do so we observe that the integrand of expression (38) can be rewritten in terms of the critical demand realization θ c EQ , by making use of expression (17) where firms start to be capacity constrained. Existence and uniqueness of (θ * , c * ) have already been established in lemma 3. We can conclude that theorem 3 characterizes a unique symmetric equilibrium candidate.
Part II) Show that deviation from the candidate equilibrium is not profitable
We now show that deviation of firm i = 1, . . . , n is not profitable if all other firms stick to the candidate equilibrium x * EQ,−i . By construction of the symmetric candidate equilibrium the first order conditions of firm i both for an interior change (expression (18) of lemma 5) and for a change of total capacity are satisfied (expression (19) of lemma 5). Moreover whenever firm i is capacity constrained (i.e. x EQ,i = 0, x * EQ (c) = x * for all c ≥ c * , "above point S in figure 9") then the first order condition for an interior change (expression (18) of lemma 5) is negative, which implies that firm i indeed finds it optimal to be capacity constrained for all c ≥ c * (Remember, this is how the unique symmetric equilibrium candidate has been determined in Part I) of the current proof).
In lemma 5 (ii) we furthermore show sufficiency of the first order conditions of firm i. changing investment for other levels of marginal cost of production. We can thus conclude that firm i will always reduce it's profits when deviating from the symmetric equilibrium candidate x * EQ . This proves existence of the symmetric equilibrium.
Part III) Show that an asymmetric equilibrium cannot exist:
We finally show that an asymmetric equilibrium of the investment market game cannot exist. The first order conditions for the optimal investment decision in an asymmetric equilibrium are the following system of differential equations: (ii) We now derive the slopes of the solutions of the above equation system (given by expressions (39) and (39) (39) and (39) imply that x i (c) < x j (c) . However this is inconsistent with the above statement (i.e. x i (c) < x j (c)).
We can thus conclude that an asymmetric equilibrium cannot exist.
Proof of Lemma 6
First determine x * EQ (c * ): Since x * EQ (c * ) = 0 both numerator and denominator of (37) 
Where according to expression (37), the critical demand realization θ 
Since by assumption 2 (iii) we have k cc (c * 
